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II. THE FBI’S INVOLVEMENT IN TORTURE
The public has been led to believe that the CIA was solely responsible for torturing
detainees, while the FBI’s hands remained clean of the dirty work. This could not be further from
the truth. The reality is that the FBI played a central and secret role from the beginning. In fact,
the FBI was involved from the first day when Abu Zubaydah was captured—both before and after
America’s first, and only, torture program was officially sanctioned by the Department of Justice.
(To be clear, the issue is not which agency is worse or deserves more blame—the issue is that both
the CIA and the FBI participated in the dehumanizing and violent torture of detainees.)
When Abu Zubaydah was first detained by the CIA in late March 2002, President Bush
approved his rendition from Pakistan to Detention Site Green, where he was questioned by special
agents of the FBI.8
He informed the interrogators that he intended to cooperate and provided
background information on his activities before his medical condition deteriorated and was
apparently hospitalized the very evening he arrived at Detention Site Green. 9 As his medical
condition worsened, he was put on a breathing tube; however, he continued to communicate with
both CIA and FBI officials while at the hospital by using an alphabet chart during this time. 10
FBI agents remained with him while he was hospitalized and immediately debriefed him
after his breathing tube was removed on April 10, 2002.11 During an FBI interrogation the same
day, Abu Zubaydah identified a man named Mukhtar as the “mastermind” of the FBI attacks and
identified “Mukhtar” in a picture.12 The picture showed Khalid Sheykh Mohammad (KSM), whom
Abu Zubaydah reported was related to Ramzi Yousef, a man convicted and imprisoned in the
United States for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center attack. 13 Abu Zubaydah further
provided information on KSM’s background. He also provided information on al-Qaida, his past
travel to the United States, and general information on extremists in Pakistan. 14 Future
representations made by the CIA about the success of the agency’s Detention and Interrogation
program describe this intelligence, specifically that on KSM, as “vital” information, although a
review of CIA records found it merely corroborated information already available in CIA
databases.15
What these representations demonstrate, however, is the close nature of the work done
between the FBI and the CIA during this early stage of Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation. The CIA
credits information revealed to the FBI as being an example of the success of its own interrogation
program, when the two agencies seemingly had two distinct – and at times, adverse – interrogation
teams.
Further, much of such information was collected prior to the CIA’s use of enhanced
interrogation techniques, yet the CIA represented that the information was acquired “as a result”
of their new torture program, using it as a pretext to continue the program. 16
While Abu Zubaydah was still hospitalized, the CIA “formally proposed that Abu
Zubaydah be kept in an all-white room that was lit 24 hours a day, that Abu Zubaydah not be
provided any amenities, that his sleep be disrupted, that loud noise be constantly fed into his cell,
and that only a small number of people interact with him,” 17 leading to a state of “learned
helplessness.”18
On April 12, 2002, in an update on the Abu Zubaydah interrogation plans, the CIA planned
to ramp up their interrogation tactics and “[i]n accordance with the strategy, and with concurrence
from FBI Headquarters, the two on-site FBI agents will no longer directly participate in the
interview/debriefing session.” (CIA Sensitive Addendum “Update on the Abu Zubaydah
Operation,” dated 12 April 2002, “1630 Hours.”) Implicit in this statement is the fact that the FBI
had previously had a “presence” in the interview room, possibly even simultaneously with CIA
interrogations. This was the same day that DCI Tenet gave orders that the CIA would have sole
custody of Zubaydah.19 The FBI special agents questioning Zubaydah at the hospital objected to
the CIA’s plans. The SSCI report does not indicate that CIA officers also remained with Abu
Zubaydah while he was hospitalized. At that time, Abu Zubaydah identified Khalid Shaykh
Mohammad (KSM) as the mastermind of the September 11 attack. 20
On April 13, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still hospitalized, the CIA implemented their
“new interrogation program” conducted by a CIA interrogator “coached by [a] psychological
team.”21 In a meeting lasting only 11 minutes, the CIA interrogator advised Abu Zubaydah that he
had a most important secret that the interrogator needed to know.” 22 Abu Zubaydah nodded in
agreement, but ultimately feel asleep.23 Though the FBI was barred from interrogating him, the
FBI officers they remained on site, sitting in the adjoining room. In a cable back to headquarters,
the FBI officers noted that they “spent the rest of the day in the adjoining room with the CIA
officer and one of the psychiatrists waiting for Abu Zubaydah to signal he was ready to talk.”24
The officers had even “explained their rapport-building approaches to the CIA interrogation team
tried to explain that [they had] used this approach before on other Al-Qaeda members with much
success”25 and “tried to politely suggest that valuable time was passing where we could attempt to
solicit threat information.”26
On April 15, 2002, “Abu Zubaydah was sedated and moved from the hospital [back] to
Detention Site Green,”27 awaking “surprised and disturbed by his new situation.” The next day, on
April 16, 2002, the interrogation strategy changed away from “total isolation as originally planned”
and towards a “24-hour interrogation strategy,” which allowed FBI officers to resume interrogating
Abu Zubaydah.20 The identities of these new interrogators were also masked to further prevent
Abu Zubaydah from identifying them, beginning in April 2002, resulting in even blurrier line
between FBI and CIA.21
The officers were to wear “all black uniforms, including boots, gloves, balaclavas, and
goggles.” 28 This was intended to prevent Abu Zubaydah “from seeing the security guards as
individuals who he may attempt to establish a relationship or dialogue with.” 29 During this time,
Abu Zubaydah was kept naked, in his cell, handcuffed, shackled, with loud music and noise
generators, and sleep deprived, to ensure that he was at his most vulnerable state. At this point,
when being stripped to nothing but a towel,30 there was a blurred line between the CIA and the
FBI, such that they were synonymous as their torturers. It is likely that in the course of the
aggravated techniques used by the CIA that Abu Zubaydah lost any good faith rapport he may
have previously had with the FBI.
On April 17, 2002, FBI officials questioned him again. 31 An officer met with him for six
hours, during which time Abu Zubaydah denied any knowledge related to specific targets and
provided only general information related to extremists in Pakistan.32 He continued to deny having
any knowledge relating to a pending attack, or specific targets, claiming that the conversations
between “brothers on the front lines” were “just talk,” such that the United States should not be
concerned.33 Although Abu Zubaydah had “not seen the interviewing agent,” he greeted the agent
by name.34 It is not clear whether this agent was required to wear the identity-concealing garb
discussed above, or if he revealed his identity to Abu Zubaydah voluntarily. In either case, after
these harsh conditions and interrogation techniques had commenced, Abu Zubaydah was
cognizant of the fact that he was still being questioned by FBI agents, although it is not clear that
Abu Zubaydah knew the distinction between the agents interrogating him from different agencies.
On April 20, 2022, he told FBI agents about men who had approached him with a plan to
detonate a uranium-based explosive device in the United States. 35 Though Abu Zubaydah
reiterated his disbelief that this was a viable plan, and that he did not know the individuals, he
provided physical descriptions of the two individuals, which the CIA later represented as having
enhanced the agency’s previous suspicions in the thwarting of the ‘Dirty Bomb Plot‘ and the
capture of Jose Padilla. 36 However, this information was provided after Abu Zubaydah was
allowed to sleep.37
On July 13, 2002, the CIA’s acting general counsel, John Rizzo, met with attorneys from
the National Security Council and the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), as
well as with Michael Chertoff, the head of the Department of Justice Criminal Division, and Daniel
Levin, the chief of staff to the FBI director, to provide an overview of the CIA’s proposed
interrogation techniques and to ask for a formal, definitive DOJ opinion regarding the lawfulness
of employing the specific CIA interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
After Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation in early June, the FBI special agents did not
return to Detention Site Green as all interrogation had ceased.
This information would later be used by the CIA as evidence in support of the use of
enhanced interrogation techniques, implying that even three months before the torture program
had officially been approved the CIA may have been experimenting with the same or different
“enhanced” techniques that the agency would employ once the program obtained formal
authorization.38 This is further evidenced by the CIA’s decision to adopt Mitchell’s most “coercive
interrogation option” out of the three strategies sent to CIA HQ around late April 2002 in the face
of FBI opposition.39
Given the presence of FBI officers during this period of intense interrogation their mere
presence, whether or not they participated in the torture, would undermine their credibility as
interrogators in Abu Zubaydah’s eyes. Even if the FBI officers did not participate in the torture, if
it occurred at that time, they undoubtedly witnessed it or had knowledge that it occurred. Indeed,
the Department of Justice concluded that FBI agents “participated in interviews in which
interrogation techniques that would not be available to an FBI agent in the United States were used
on Zubaydah.”40 Further, Abu Zubaydah’s perception of who was interrogating him was entirely
dependent on what the interrogator chose to share.
FBI agents reported that during this time, CIA personnel impersonated FBI agents in
interviews with detainees.41 More importantly, the interrogator’s identity and employer would be
inconsequential to Abu Zubaydah once the torture had begun because a reasonable person in that
situation would realize that any interaction with agents of the United States government could
result in further torture based on the things that he said or did not say.
Any ability to get a clean confession would be tainted by his fear that anything he said
could lead to further torture, altering his decision matrix and creating uncertainty as to the accuracy
of any statements he made after the torture began. If in fact the CIA began using enhanced
interrogation techniques before they were legally authorized, any confessions taken by the FBI
after that time should be viewed skeptically
